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The U.S. No Longer 
Makes the Grade
Economic Inequality Put an End to the “American Century”  
By	David	S.	Mason
In his State of the Union address last January, U.S. President Barack Obama said that “anyone who tells you that America is in decline or that our influence has waned, doesn’t know what they’re talking about.” Former Utah Gov. Jon Huntsman, when in 
the race for the 2012 Republican presidential nomination, warned that unless Americans 
changed directions, they would see the “end of the American century by 2015.” As bright 
and capable as both of these politicians are, they are both whistling in the wind. The 
American century — the post-World War II era of U.S. global leadership and dominance 
— ended a decade ago, and it is not coming back. While that does not mean the cessation 
of American wealth and might, it does mark a significant transformation in U.S. society 
and economics, and the country’s place in the world. To cope with this transformation, 
Americans needs to recognize the nation’s relative decline.
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The “American century” as a term was the 
title of an influential essay written in 1941 
for Life magazine by its publisher, Henry 
Luce. As Hitler’s armies stormed across 
Europe, Luce called on the U.S. to shoulder 
world leadership, come to the defense of ally 
Britain in the wake of Nazi blitzes, and 
“promote, encourage and incite so-called 
democratic principles throughout the world.” 
Such action would “inspire us [Americans] 
to live and work and fight with vigor and en-
thusiasm” and, in turn, “create the first great 
American century.”1 Indeed, in the next 
several decades, the U.S. propelled world 
trade and economic growth. Its science and 
technology provided the leading edge of in-
novation and discovery. The country’s demo-
cratic institutions and educational system 
served as beacons all over the world. Its 
popular and consumer cultures were envied 
and mimicked everywhere. And American 
military prowess was admired and feared by 
governments and revolutionaries alike.
Yet in recent decades, particularly since 
9/11, every aspect of this American pre-
dominance has faded. The U.S. economy, 
riddled with debt (both government and 
household), has not yet recovered from its 
steepest decline since 1946;2 economic ex-
pansion over the last decade, averaging just 
1.7 percent, marks the most prolonged slow 
period since the Depression.3 American ed-
ucation, once the world’s best, now ranks 
near the bottom among developed coun-
tries.4 U.S. corporations, once exemplars of 
dynamism, innovation and efficiency, are 
hampered by bureaucracy, corruption and 
bloated executive payrolls, and few gener-
ate ingenuity, growth or jobs, at least in this 
country. Apple, for example, manufactures 
almost all of its iPhones, iPads, and other 
products overseas, when not long ago they 
were made in America.5 While U.S. con-
sumer goods and popular culture remain 
fashionable in much of the world, there is 
at the same time increasing resistance to 
American culture and traditions.6 Witness, 
for example, the global proliferation of the 
“Occupy Wall Street” movements. Even the 
red, white and blue political machine, 
awash in money, is no longer the favored 
method for political development.7 And the 
U.S. Constitution is increasingly viewed in 
other countries as antiquated both in its def-
inition of government powers and narrow 
sense of human rights (for example, not in-
cluding gender equality or ensuring educa-
tion or healthcare).8 And while America 
used to be considered the epitome of eco-
nomic opportunity and social mobility, 
recent studies demonstrate that the U.S. 
lags behind many other countries even on 
this cherished value.9 
The	U.S.	takes	one	step	forward,		
two	steps	back
These were all themes of my book, 
The End of the American Century, pub-
lished by Rowman & Littlefield in 2008 
— before the economic collapse that 
began that year, and before the election 
of President Obama. (Also, go online to 
endoftheamericancentury.blogspot.com.) 
In the years since, the situation has im-
proved in some respects and worsened in 
others, though the overall picture remains 
the same. 
On the positive side, Obama at least par-
tially restored America’s international repu-
tation — which had been so badly battered 
by the George W. Bush administration with 
the Iraq War, the flaunting of international 
law, and the sanctioning of torture — by 
ending the war, pledging to respect interna-
tional law, banning torture, and promising 
that the U.S. would be a better global 
citizen.10 Also, Obama’s healthcare reform 
brings the U.S. closer to the far superior al-
ternatives of other developed countries. 
And his economic stim-
ulus plan helped stabi-
lize the free-falling 
economy and stem the 
alarming upswing in 
unemployment (at 10 
percent at its worst in 
late 2009 and down to a 
little more than eight 
percent as of July). 
On the other hand, 
the U.S. national debt 
ballooned to more than 
$15 trillion — dwarfing 
the $10 trillion of 2008 
that many historians and 
economists thought was 
unsustainable even then. 
A quarter century ago, 
in his book The Rise 
and Fall of the Great 
Powers, historian Paul 
Kennedy pointed to the 
U.S. federal debt, then at 44 percent of gross 
domestic product, as a worrisome conse-
quence of “imperial overstretch” — a 
common feature of the historical collapse of 
great empires. The only other historical 
example of a great power becoming so in-
debted in peacetime was France in the 
1780s, where the fiscal crisis was one of the 
major causes of the French Revolution. 
Today, Kennedy’s concerns seem almost 
quaint, with the federal debt approaching 
100 percent of gross domestic product. 
Furthermore, in many other respects, the 
U.S. continues to lose ground. Domestical-
ly, while the stock market and economy 
have picked up somewhat, the unemploy-
ment rate of some eight percent remains 
stubbornly high, with a persistence not seen 
since the Depression era.11 Poverty rates are 
among the highest since the early 1960s,12 
and economic inequality is the highest 
since the Depression, with the top one 
percent earning almost 24 percent of the 
nation’s income (as it had in 1928, too).13 
Internationally, while the U.S. reputation 
has been restored somewhat, American in-
fluence worldwide is waning. The U.S. was 
unable to accomplish its stated missions in 
either Iraq or Afghanistan, and the biggest 
global political changes happening right 
now — the “Arab Spring” and the rise of 
political Islam — are almost totally 
removed from any American pull, much 
less control. Meanwhile, China continues 
its march toward financial superpower 
status, with the world’s second biggest and 
fastest-growing major economy. 
This multidimensional decline of the 
U.S. is worrisome for American citizens 
and leaders alike, of course, and is the 
principal motive for the fragmentation and 
bitterness in American political life. Job 
loss and increasing poverty, in the face of 
unprecedented corporate and Wall Street 
wealth (with average CEO pay now 
almost $13 million14), fuel protest and ex-
tremism on both the right and the left. The 
roots of fear and hos-
tility in the Tea Party 
have much in common 
with those of Occupy 
Wall Street; both 
camps feel marginal-
ized and helpless vis-
à-vis those in power, 
whether in government 
or corporations. The 
2010 “Citizens 
United” decision of 
the Supreme Court, es-
sentially allowing un-
limited corporate con-
tributions to political 
campaigns, opened the 
floodgates for money 
in politics — an issue 
that was a serious 
problem even before 
that decision. This 
ruling will strengthen 
the clout of monied interests in U.S. poli-
tics and almost certainly exacerbate the 
doubt and alienation felt by ordinary 
Americans. Indeed, a new national poll 
shows Americans’ distrust of government 
at its highest level ever.15 
America	gets	in	its	own	way
The polarized political environment — 
intensified by sharpened rhetoric and bitter 
invective (e.g., a congressman yelling “you 
lie” at President Obama during the latter’s 
fall 2009 speech to the chamber) — has 
rendered almost impossible any effort to 
address the huge and varied issues con-
fronting the country. Furthermore, the very 
issue of U.S. decline has itself become part 
of the political debate, compounding this 
predicament. Some, like the neoconserva-
tive historian and former State Department 
official Robert Kagan, argue that the 
decline of America is “a myth,” pointing to 
the global acceptance of American values 
and principles and the continued supremacy 
of the country’s military.16 Many other poli-
ticians and commentators acknowledge and 
rue American decline, but bicker about 
whom to blame.
American education, once 
the world’s best, now ranks 
near the bottom among 
developed countries.  U.S. 
corporations, once exemplars 
of dynamism, innovation 
and efficiency, are hampered 
by bureaucracy, corruption 
and bloated executive 
payrolls, and few generate 
ingenuity, growth or jobs, at 
least in this country. 
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Two other factors complicate things: the 
almost fanatical desire of Americans to be 
No. 1 at everything; and the paradoxical 
condition that the U.S. can be both the best 
and the worst at the same time. This is the 
case, for example, of both healthcare and 
higher education. No one contests that the 
best medical care in the world is available 
in this country. But on almost every statisti-
cal measure (e.g., quality and access of 
healthcare; infant mortality), the average 
level of healthcare for American citizens 
underperforms the industrialized world, 
winding up near the rear.17 Similarly, the 
U.S. boasts the world’s best universities, 
but in international comparisons and inter-
national competitions, American students 
fare abysmally.18
The main reason for this seeming 
paradox is inequality. For those who can 
afford it, the world’s best medical care and 
best universities are there for the taking. 
But the U.S. has the largest percentage of 
poor people of any developed country19 and 
the most unequal distribution of wealth and 
income.20 The poor, often saddled with un-
employment, broken homes, violent envi-
ronments, ineffective schools, and inade-
quate health insurance, end up dragging 
down the “averages” for the nation. It is be-
coming increasingly clear that inequality 
hurts society as a whole. A recent global 
study by the International Monetary Fund, 
for example, found that countries with 
strong economic growth tended to have 
greater income inequality than those with 
weak growth and concluded that “sustain-
able economic reform is possible only 
when its benefits are widely shared.”21 Over 
the past quarter century, this has not been 
the case in the U.S., where the rich have 
prospered, and the situation of almost 
everyone else has stagnated.
Change	the	mindset	to	rise	to	the	occasion
Economic inequality is, in my view, the 
key to all other aspects of American do-
mestic and global decline. This disparity 
has widened steadily since the 1970s22 
and is a major factor in the quadrupling of 
U.S. household debt from 1975 to 2007 
(adjusted for inflation).23 While the stan-
dard of living for most Americans re-
mained unchanged during this time, the 
rich got richer.24 And the top marginal tax 
rate in 1963 was 91 percent but by 2003 it 
had fallen to 35 percent. So the only 
source for increased tax revenue — the 
increasingly wealthy rich — was short-
circuited by a simultaneous and long-term 
decline in tax rates for the wealthy. Con-
sequently, the government was starved of 
increased revenues to cope with the bur-
geoning poor, and the escalating needs for 
healthcare, education, infrastructure, etc. 
As citizens had to borrow more, so did 
the government, fostering the liquidity 
crisis both find themselves in now.
These problems did not originate with 
Obama, or Bush, or any other single 
president or political party. Over decades, 
inequality grew, tax rates declined, poverty 
increased, and household and government 
debt mushroomed. Over a generation, 
Americans consumed more than they pro-
duced, spent more than they saved — in 
general lived beyond their means. What 
took 25 years to develop cannot be reme-
died in a few years, or by one or two presi-
dential administrations; corrections will 
take at least a generation. Such plights are 
not temporary or episodic, but structural 
and systemic. They are both a cause of and 
a consequence of global change as well: the 
end of the Cold War and “bipolarity;” the 
spread of economic globalization; the sway 
of transnational movements and organiza-
tions; and the rise of new forces like China. 
As financial expert and author David Roth-
kopf observes in his recent book Power, 
Inc., lines have become blurred “between 
corporations and individuals, companies 
and states, nations and the global commu-
nity.”25 The U.S., which so effectively 
managed the changes of the postwar world, 
is neither prepared nor equipped to deal 
with these new challenges.
An even more difficult obstacle for 
most Americans is psychological — rec-
ognizing and accepting that the U.S. is no 
longer No. 1 in everything, and moving 
on from that. There are, after all, consid-
erable advantages to not being No. 1 in-
ternationally: less a target of resentment, 
blame, and anger; and less frequently ex-
pected to intervene on international or 
global quandaries. The country will more 
easily be able to approach such issues on 
its own terms. Becoming less voracious 
consumers will reduce America’s substan-
tial burden on global resources and the 
environment, too. Similarly, in the domes-
tic sphere, an honest recognition that the 
U.S. is no longer “the first” or “the best” 
in this or that will enable it to confront 
those areas and try to redress them. It is 
unlikely, for example, that America can 
restore its global economic competitive-
ness until fixing the educational paradigm 
and modernizing infrastructure.
The U.S. will not return to the easy 
global dominance it enjoyed during the 
American century. Its formidable military 
power is now mostly irrelevant, perhaps 
even counterproductive, in a world where 
the biggest threats to humanity come from 
climate change, terrorism, famine, and 
disease rather than from armies charging 
borders. America’s considerable economic 
power is not the global juggernaut that it 
once was. And the “soft power” of consum-
er society, popular culture, and political 
schema has lost some of its luster as many 
other countries have emerged with hipper, 
more attractive, or more efficient models 
(like China, Japan, Germany, and Brazil).
While the U.S. may not be No. 1 in any 
single dimension, it remains a strong and 
successful society in virtually every area of 
human endeavor. This is perhaps the key to 
understanding America’s continuing vital-
ity, even in relative decline. There is no 
other country quite like it, with its combi-
nation of democratic institutions, imposing 
economy, entrepreneurial spirit, large pop-
ulation, abundant territory, and bountiful 
materials. Harnessing all of this, once 
again, will require wise and dedicated po-
litical leadership, and a spirit of common 
purpose and compromise. It also will 
require policies that enable the capable yet 
provide for the poor. The American 
economy is in transition from one based on 
consumption, financial services, and debt 
to something else, yet to be determined. 
But because this transition is systematic, it 
will be long-term, and in the process, many 
people will be left behind by the old 
economy or displaced by the transition 
itself. Those people will have to be sup-
ported until the new economy is function-
ing properly and unemployment stabilizes. 
This means sacrifices by all Americans, 
and particularly by those who have benefit-
ted so much from the lopsided growth of 
the last 30 years, as the country strives 
anew to make the grade. n
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